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WASTE MANAGEMENT IN THE U.S. CONTEXT:
TRADE OR ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUE?
Matthew Schaefert
INTRODUCTION
Let me preface my remarks by saying that I was born and raised in
Michigan. Hopefully, that fact will not influence my remarks too much.
I should also say that I am a visiting professor at Florida State University
this semester. I had some students coming in with questions about the exam,
and I told them that I would not be around Thursday or Friday. They asked
why, and I said I had to go to Cleveland to talk trash.
THE MOVEMENT OF WASTE PRODUCTS
There are three or four general categories of "waste." There is "municipal
solid waste" (the waste that comes out of households, hotels, restaurants,
businesses, etc.), "hazardous waste," and "nuclear waste," the latter of which
is sometimes divided into low-level and high-level nuclear waste. (My
remarks today will focus almost exclusively on municipal solid waste and
hazardous waste).
How, Why, and How Much Waste Moves
Regardless of how we come out on the question of whether waste is a
trade or environmental issue or whether we say it is both, it is certainly a
political issue. Anyone who has read The New York Times in the last couple
of days may be aware that the governor of South Carolina, a Democrat, is
threatening to have the state police block shipments of weapons-grade
plutonium coming from Colorado that will be converted into nuclear fuel in
South Carolina.1 However, the conversion technology has not been fully
developed yet, and South Carolina is worried that the nuclear waste will end
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law, Lincoln, Nebraska.
B.A., University of Chicago; J.D., magna cum laude, LL.M., S.J.D., University of Michigan.
Additional biographical information available at page xvii.
1 See David Firestone, Nuclear Waste Move Spews Political Fallout in 2 States, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 17, 2002, at A14.
1
Schaefer: Waste Management in the U.S. Context: Trade or Environmental Issu
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 2002
CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL
up staying in the state should the technology not perform as promised2 -
much to the detriment of a Democratic governor and to the benefit of a
Republican senator in Colorado, both of whom are running for reelection. It
is important to keep in mind that this is a highly political issue, not just with
respect to nuclear waste, but also with respect to hazardous waste and
municipal solid waste.
All of us are most familiar with municipal solid waste. Where does
municipal solid waste end up? The vast majority of U.S. municipal solid
waste - 57 percent - goes to landfills. 3  Twenty-two percent of U.S.
municipal solid waste is recycled,4 fifteen percent is incinerated,5 and six
percent is composted. 6 Over thirty million tons of that waste - that is, over 11
percent of the total waste stream - crosses state lines each year.7 Eighty
percent of that waste goes to a neighboring state; going through one state to
take the trash to another is much less common.8
Why does waste move across boundaries both between states and between
Canada and the United States? People are trying to dispose of their waste at
the lowest cost, and there are several reasons why we might move trash
across the border. It might be more convenient; the closest landfill may not
be within your state or province, but just across the border. It may also be
that you have a shortage of landfills in your home state or province. Another
reason that waste can move is because of differences in regulatory regimes
between jurisdictions. In fact, a study commissioned by the North American
Commission for Environmental Cooperation found that the increased level of
hazardous waste exports from the United States to Canada between 1993 and
1998 was attributable to the lower standards for the disposal of hazardous
waste in Ontario and Quebec.9 My understanding is that some of those
2 See id.
3 See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE IN THE UNITED
STATES: 1999 FINAL REPORT 16 (1999).
' Id. at 3.
5 See id. at 15.
6 Id. at 3.
7 States are importing about 32 million tons of waste, or over 14 percent of all waste
generated in the U.S. Perspectives on Interstate and International Shipments of Municipal
Solid Waste: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Env't and Hazardous Materials of the House
Comm. on Energy and Com., 107th Cong. 1 (2001) (statement of Rep. Paul Gillmor, Member,
House Comm. on Energy and Com.), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/107/
action/107-61.pdf [hereinafter House Hearing on MSW].
8 See id. at 89 (statement of Bruce Parker, Executive Vice President, National Solid
Wastes Management Association).
9 See MARISA JACOTT, ET AL., TEXAS CENTER FOR POLICY STUDIES, THE GENERATION AND
MANAGEMENT OF HAZARDOUS WASTES AND TRANSBOUNDARY HAZARDOUS WASTE SHIPMENTS
BETWEEN MEXICO, CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES, 1990-2000 56-58 (2001), available at
http://www.texascenter.org/publications/haznafta.pdf.
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regulations have been tightened, 10 so that trend may be reversing a little bit.
Lastly, waste may move simply because there are no safe means of disposal
in the jurisdiction the waste was produced. Certain types of hazardous
wastes require specialized disposal facilities, and there may not be any
located within the jurisdiction in question.
Waste Imports from Canada
For some states, trash imports are of particular concern. Twenty percent
of Michigan's waste stream comes from outside the state;" forty-five percent
of that out-of-state waste stream comes from Canada, much of it from
Toronto. 12 One of the big worries for Michigan is that Toronto is in the
process of closing down its lone remaining landfill. 13 Toronto was going to
ship its waste by train and dump it in an abandoned mine north of the city,
but that project was not approved. 14 Therefore, Michigan is not only worried
about current levels of waste imports, but anticipates receiving even more
garbage from Toronto in the future.
Canadian trash is not a political issue in Michigan alone, but it is where
the issue is most prominent. The other two states that are taking the highest
percentage of Canadian trash, as a percent of out-of-state waste, are New
York and Washington. 15 Other states are less concerned with Canadian
imports and more concerned with waste coming from other states. For
example, Virginia imports about 27 percent of its waste stream from out-of-
10 Since Ontario and Quebec have tightened their environmental standards to match those
of the United States, British Columbia may become the next popular destination for U.S.
hazardous wastes. See Martin Mittelstaedt, B.C. Agrees to Take Tonnes of Dioxin-Laced U.S.
Waste, GLOBE & MAIL, Jan. 24, 2002, at Al.
11 WASTE MANAGEMENT DIVISION, MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF WATER QUALITY, REPORT
OF SOLID WASTE LANDFILLED IN MICHIGAN, OCTOBER 1, 2000 - SEPTEMBER 30, 2001 2 (2002),
available at http://www.deq.state.mi.us/documents/deq-wmd-swp-RPTSWLANDFILL200l.
PDF.
2 See id. 11,872,507 cubic yards of waste are imported into Michigan each year, and
5,894,738 cubic yards of this are coming from Canada, or 49.65% of total imports.
13 See House Hearing on MSW, supra note 7, at 42 (statement of Rep. Mike Rogers of
Michigan), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/107/action/107-61 .pdf.
14 See, e.g., James Rusk, City Official Rejects Garbage-Plan Review, GLOBE & MAIL, Mar.
7, 2001, at A15.
15 Fifteen percent of New York and Washington State's imports of MSW come from
Canada. See House Hearing on MSW, supra note 7, at 45.
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state and foreign sources, 16 but the majority of those imports come from New
York, Maryland and Washington, D.C. 7
In terms of hazardous waste, 96 percent of Canada's imports and 97
percent of its exports are with the United States. 18 We often hear complaints
from Toronto and other parts of Ontario regarding hazardous waste imports
because most of the hazardous waste exported from the United States is
going to Ontario and Quebec. (To paraphrase a frequent refrain from
Ontario: "Sure, we are sending you our municipal solid waste, Michigan, but
you in the United States are sending us your hazardous waste, and that is not
a fair trade."). 19 However, Canada's imports of hazardous waste amount to
only one-tenth of the production of hazardous waste within Canada.2°
Imports, while not miniscule, are still relatively small.
WASTE AS TRADE: DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
JURISPRUDENCE
The question now becomes: under what rules does garbage move? One
of the reasons it moves is because it is allowed to move. In fact, under the
legal rules that are established for trade in municipal solid waste and
hazardous waste, it is encouraged to move.
The Open-Border, Non-Discrimination Model: Philadelphia v. New Jersey
In the United States, there are constitutional rules that deal with trade,
including trade in garbage, between the states. We have a provision in the
U.S. Constitution called the Commerce Clause, an explicit grant of power to
the Congress to regulate interstate and foreign commerce. 21 For well over
150 years, the courts have interpreted the Commerce Clause to also impose
limits on states discriminating against or unduly burdening interstate and
foreign commerce, even in those situations where Congress does not utilize
22its Commerce Clause powers to preempt the states. In other words, even
where Congress' Commerce Clause powers lie dormant, there are limits on
16 Out of the 14,884,106 tons of MSW placed in Virginia landfills, 4,098,684 tons, or
27.5%, came from out-of-state sources. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, SOLID WASTE MANAGED IN VIRGINIA DURING CALENDAR YEAR
2001 i (2002).
17 id.
18 See Backgrounder: Hazardous Waste Management in Canada, at http://www.ec.gc.ca/
Press/2001/010803 b_e.htm (last visited July 3, 2002) [hereinafter Backgrounder].
19 See, e.g., Editorial, Time to Review Canada's Hazardous-Waste Imports, GLOBE &
MAIL, June 28, 2001, at A14.
20 See Backgrounder, supra note 18.
21 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
22 See generally Gibbons v. Ogden, 20 U.S. 1 (1824).
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state actions under the aptly-named dormant Commerce Clause. The
landmark dormant Commerce Clause case dealing with waste trade is
Philadelphia v. New Jersey.23 In the 1970s, Philadelphia, a big urban area
with little of its own landfill space, sent its garbage to New Jersey for
disposal. However, New Jersey decided not to accept any more out-of-state
trash, with a few narrow exceptions. 24 The Supreme Court struck down New
Jersey's nearly complete ban on waste imports under the dormant Commerce
Clause. The Court held that although garbage may sometimes be considered
valueless it is to be treated no differently than other interstate commerce in
terms of dormant Commerce Clause constraints.25 Indeed, garbage trade
involves purchases of transportation and disposal services that clearly are
interstate commerce. The Court rejected New Jersey's attempt to analogize
to cases involving quarantine laws that deal with dangers arising from the
very movement of noxious articles. State regulations targeting waste from
foreign countries for discriminatory treatment as opposed to all out-of-state
waste have also been invalidated under the dormant Commerce Clause.
,After the Philadelphia decision, a few states tried new (and more
creative) methods to inhibit the influx of out-of-state and foreign waste. For
instance, the State of Michigan said that it would not erect a barrier at the
state line, but instead permit counties to refuse to accept out-of-county
waste. 26 This resulted in counties discriminating against not only out-of-state
and foreign waste but also a good deal of in-state waste (by not accepting
27
waste from any place else in the state). The Supreme Court said nice try,
but the same problem still exists. The Court found the Michigan law
indistinguishable from that considered in Philadelphia v. New Jersey, ruling
based on prior precedent that a state may not avoid dormant Commerce
Clause constraints "by curtailing the movement of articles through
subdivisions of the State, rather than through the State itself.
28
Several states tried levying extra fees on out-of-state and foreign waste.
In Alabama, the state imposed extra fees on out-of-state hazardous waste.29
A case from Oregon dealt with regular municipal solid waste.30 However,
23 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
24 Id. at 478 n.2.
25 Justice Potter Stewart, writing for the majority, notes that garbage is akin to any other
"[article] of commerce" that comes from out of state, and, unless New Jersey could find "some
reason, apart from their origin, to treat them differently," the statute forbidding its entry into
the State violated the nondiscrimination principle of the dormant Commerce Clause. Id. at
626-627.
26 See Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill v. Mich. Dept. of Natural Resources, 504 U.S. 353,
356-357 (1992).
27 See id. at 358.
28 See id. at 361.
29 See Chemical Waste Management v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 336 (1992).
30 Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Oregon Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93 (1994).
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the Supreme Court struck them both down, ruling that fee-based
discrimination, although not an absolute ban on interstate waste movement,
still facially discriminates against out-of-state and foreign waste and is
therefore per se invalid under the dormant Commerce Clause.3' Oregon tried
to justify the extra fees as a legitimate compensatory tax.32 (The best example
of this is use taxes being valid compensatory taxes for sales taxes. 33) Oregon
observed that in-state businesses pay for environmental protection through
the income tax structure. Accordingly, it claimed that the reason why the
state was charging out-of-state waste a higher fee is because those who are
benefiting from its disposal have not paid general Oregon income taxes that,
among other general revenue expenses, pay for environmental protection.
34
However, the Court rejected the compensatory tax rationale. Prior cases
established that any legitimate compensatory tax must be on an event
"sufficiently similar in substance to serve" as a proxy 35 to the event on which
in-state businesses must pay taxes, and the Court logically ruled that earning
income and utilizing landfills were not similar events.36
Thus, the Supreme Court has adopted an open border, non-discrimination
model for the movement of waste. In doing so, the Court has relied on the
underlying purposes of the Commerce Clause: to prevent the Balkanization
of the States and to prevent international retaliation from foreign trading
partners. 37 The Supreme Court is unwilling to allow a state to isolate itself
38from problems, such as a shortage of landfill sites, common to many states.
31 Id. at 108; Chemical Waste, 504 U.S. at 337.
32 See, e.g., Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. at 102.
33 Use taxes are permissible if they do not discriminate against interstate commerce. See
id. at 103 n.6., 105.
34 See id. at 104.
I d. at 103 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
36 Id. at 104-105.
37 See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979); Japan Line, Ltd. v. Los Angeles,
441 U.S. 434, 448-451 (1979).
38 See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978):
Today, cities in Pennsylvania and New York find it expedient or necessary to send
their waste into New Jersey for disposal, and New Jersey claims the right to close its
borders to such traffic. Tomorrow, cities in New Jersey may find it expedient or
necessary to send their waste into Pennsylvania or New York for disposal, and those
States might then claim the right to close their borders. The Commerce Clause will
protect New Jersey in the future, just as it protects her neighbors now, from efforts by
one State to isolate itself in the stream of interstate commerce from a problem shared
by all.
The Supreme Court turned out to be correct. In 1995, New Jersey exported 46% of its waste
stream to Pennsylvania. See Federal Regulation to Control Unwanted Municipal Waste
Imports, at http://www.dep.state.pa.us/dep/deputate/airwaste/wm/MRW/Docs/waste-fedleg.
htm (last visited July 3, 2002).
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The open border, non-discrimination model for waste trade has a strong
base of support within the Court. It is highly unlikely that the Court would
ever reverse itself on the open border, non-discrimination model. In the
waste trade cases, even Justices Scalia and Thomas, both staunch defenders
of states' rights and dubious of the current breadth of the dormant Commerce
Clause, usually join five other justices in the majority. Chief Justice
Rehnquist typically has just one justice join him in dissent.39 The U.S.-
Canada bilateral treaty on waste trade also encourages waste trade by
claiming that "the close trading relationship and common border between the
United States and Canada engenders opportunities for generators to benefit
from using nearest appropriate disposal facility. 4 °
Problems with the Open-Border, Non-Discrimination Model
What are the problems that people see with the Supreme Court's non-
discrimination model? The most frequent attack on an open market model is
to declare that there are externalities - costs that the market does not take
into account. Externalities that critics of the open borders, non-
discrimination model point to include: 1) extra paper work, more inspections,
and higher administrative costs; 2) falling real estate values as no one wants
to live next to a landfill; 4 3) infrastructure and transportation costs to
accepting out-of-state waste (e.g., one of the complaints from Michigan is
that there are 180 trucks coming from Canada with garbage every day, and
that imposes a cost on the road infrastructure); 42 and 4) nuisance costs and
the costs of stigmatization, for no state wants the moniker of "Garbage
State."
39 In all the cases mentioned in this Article concerning waste, Renhquist dissented. See
Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 629 (joined by Burger, C.J.); Chemical Waste, 504 U.S. at 349; Fort
Gratiot, 504 U.S. at 368 (joined by Blackmun, J.); Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. at 108 (joined by
Blackmun, J.). Rehnquist joined the dissenting opinion of Justice Souter in C & A Carbone v.
Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383,410 (1994).
40 See Agreement Concerning the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste, U.S.-
Can., Oct. 28, 1986, T.I.A.S. 11,099. The Treaty was amended in 1992 to include non-
hazardous waste primarily so that Canada can now regulate RCRA-exempt waste and
municipal waste under the bilateral if necessary to conform to the Basel Convention on the
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, 28
I.L.M. 649 (1989), to which Canada is a party but not the United States (the Basel Convention
has a broader definition of hazardous waste than current U.S. law and regulations).
41 See V. Kerry Smith & William H. Desvousges, The Value of Avoiding a LULU:
Hazardous Waste Disposal Sites, 68 REV. EcON. STAT. 293, 298 (1986) (A survey of Boston
households revealed that the distance from a hazardous waste disposal site is valued at $330 to
$495 per mile per year).
42 See Letter from the Honorable Dick Posthumus, Lieutenant Governor of Michigan, to
the Honourable Betty Disero, Chair, Works Committee, Toronto City Council (Nov. 13, 2001)
(available at http://www.michigan.govltgov/1,1431,7-104-4944-,00.html).
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However, one important question that needs to be asked in the context of
waste trade (or waste moving across state or national borders) is whether out-
of-state waste creates additional externalities? If the state has a landfill, it
should not matter where the waste is coming from because for almost all the
externalities listed above there is no difference between out-of-state waste
and in-state waste with the exception of transportation costs. Generally, out-
of-state waste will travel more miles across the state than in-state waste,
although this obviously might not be true for any particular shipment. In any
event, transportation infrastructure externalities are rather meager. For
example, Oregon tried to break down the externalities to account for the
$2.25/ton fee that was imposed on out-of-state waste (the one that was later
struck down by the Supreme Court).43 As it turns out, only about four cents
out of that $2.25 was attributable to transportation infrastructure costs. 44
Thus, we can say there are some externalities associated with out-of-state and
foreign waste greater than those associated with in-state waste, but they are
not significant. Moreover, the issue of transport externalities could be best
addressed through a per-mile fee rather than a differential fee for out-of-state
waste (because, again, some in-state shipments will travel greater miles in the
state than out-of-state shipments).
The other critical question to ask with respect to externalities is what
devices that states and localities can employ to correct for them. A state or
locality can use equal fees on in-state and out-of-state garbage being
disposed in-state as a means of forcing companies to internalize these costs.
The revenues from these fees can then be directed at economic development
in the locality where the disposal site is located, such as paying for schools
and roads. Indeed, since real estate values will likely drop along with
property tax collections, the fees would need to be high enough to replenish
this loss of revenue. However, some may want to be more paternalistic.
Some may find it offensive that certain towns use a landfill as an economic
development tool, just as some object to states or localities using gambling
for similar purposes. Opponents of using landfills as an economic
development tool may argue that the communities that accept waste simply
do not have adequate bargaining power regarding fees or point to
imperfections in local political processes. Opponents might also criticize
other possible regimes of forcing an internalization of costs such as the tort
liability regime (due to its high transaction costs) or federal regulations and
enforcement (due to their weakness). But, again, the key point in rebuttal to
these opponents is that the problems that exist in finding adequate means to
43 Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. at 96.
44 About $0.03 was attributable to maintaining "publicly supported infrastructure"; $0.01
was compensation for "nuisance impacts from transportation." Id. at 109 n. 1 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting).
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correct for externalities has little or nothing to do with any inherent
differences between out-of-state and in-state waste.
It is interesting to discover that the open borders, non-discrimination
model for the waste trade disturbs even those we would associate most with
the law-and-economics perspective. Professor Richard Epstein, the
University of Chicago law professor whose name is most associated with the
law and economics movement, is uncomfortable with this open border, non-
discrimination model for trade in waste products.45 I, an economics major at
University of Chicago as an undergraduate, also am a bit uncomfortable with
the model standing by itself. My discomfort has less to do with possible
differential transportation infrastructure externalities or the fact that there
may be other small additional externalities connected with out-of-state waste
as opposed to in-state waste; rather, it has more to do with the additional
complexities of dealing with long-term environmental consequences. I think
it is very tough to quantify, and accordingly measure, these costs. As with
many other environmental problems such as global warming, the waste
disposal problem is intergenerational. Like the carbon dioxide that stays in
the atmosphere for 100 years,46 landfills not only affect the people that
approved of them; they potentially affect those who are around in the next
three to four generations.47 These future generations do not have a vote.
Thus, the model must be accompanied by flexible waste reduction strategies.
SOLUTIONS ON THE HORIZON?
Proposals for a "Proximity" or "Discrimination" Model for Waste Trading
The U.S. Congress has the power to pass legislation that would move us
toward a proximity and discrimination model of waste trade. Such
legislation would, in effect, overturn the Supreme Court's dormant
Commerce Clause decisions. Under a proximity and discrimination model,
the presumption is that garbage should be disposed of in the state or locality
in which it is created and that states or localities can discriminate against out-
of-state or out-of-locality waste. Recall that the Commerce Clause grants
Congress the power to regulate interstate and foreign trade and that the
Supreme Court's dormant Commerce Clause decisions apply only in the
absence of a Congressional view being expressed on the matter. Further,
45 For Epstein's discussion of this issue, see Richard A. Epstein, Waste and the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 3 GREEN BAG 21 29, 33-37 (1999).
46 See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, CLIMATE SCIENCE 3 (1997), at
http://www.epa.gov/globalwarming/presentations/science/stock/all-science.pdf.
47 I should note that new technologies are making creative use of old landfills and that
these new technologies will reduce potential impacts on future generations.
2002]
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nothing in the Commerce Clause prevents the Congress from allowing or
authorizing states to discriminate against waste from other states or Canada.
In fact, there have been bills introduced in the Congress for the past ten years
that would authorize states to restrict out-of-state and foreign waste flows.
48
These bills contain a variety of restrictions that states would be allowed to
utilize, including limiting waste imports to 1993 amounts, limiting imports to
20% of total waste disposal, differential surcharges on out-of-state waste, and
allowing laws that restrict granting new licenses for waste disposal facilities
based on the "needs" of the state. None of the bills has ever passed in part
because the Supreme Court's jurisprudence has left all of the leverage in the
hands of the "exporting" states.
Setting aside the political dynamics, there are many reasons to be wary of
any dramatic or quick move away from the current open border, non-
discrimination model. A proximity model translates into building a greater
number of small landfills. The trend toward building larger, regional
landfills that use vastly improved, "cleaner" technology has already resulted
in the reduction of the number of landfills in the United States, from about
10,000 in 1990 to about 2,600 today.4 9 Many of the smaller landfills have
been closed down because they could not comply with the federal Resource
Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA)50 requirements. 5'
Additionally, if elements of a discrimination model were not phased in
over time, we run the risk that states will be forced into placing waste in
temporary facilities that would not meet the relevant environmental
standards. Moreover, as waste disposal and landfill companies have already
made investments based on the long-standing Dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, there are reliance costs. Indeed, there is some possibility of
creating a claim under NAFTA's investment chapter that allows private
investor to host state arbitration for violation of NAFTA's investment
obligations 52 or even a claim for breach of NAFTA trade obligations.
48 See Perspectives on Interstate and International Shipments of Municipal Solid Waste:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Env't and Hazardous Materials of the House Comm. on
Energy and Com., 107th Cong. 5 (2001) (statement of Rep. John Dingell, Member, House
Comm. on Energy and Com.), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/107/action/107-
61 .pdf.
49 According to the EPA, the number of landfills in the U.S. fell from about 8,000 in 1988
to about 2,300 in 1999. See Municipal Solid Waste: Basic Facts, at http://www.epa.gov/
epaoswer/non-hw/muncpl/facts.htm (last visited July 3, 2002).
50 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 82 (1976).
51 Id., § 6944.
52 See, e.g., S.D. Myers v. Canada, 40 I.L.M. 1408 (2001) (successful claim against
Canada for ban on the export of PCBs to the detriment of S.D. Myers, which sought to process
PCBs at a Cleveland facility. The arbitral tribunal found no environmental rationale for the
measure other than keeping Canadian industry strong in order to assure continued disposal
capacity; this could have been achieved by using a less discriminatory measure).
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Creating Transnational Standards for Waste Reduction
While there are reasons to be wary of a leap to a proximity or
discrimination model, there are also reasons to be wary of simply preserving
the status quo. The status quo is likely to lead to ever increasing inventive
attempts by individual states to circumvent the edges of dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence. Moreover, even some legitimate attempts at waste
reduction may be caught in the net of the dormant Commerce Clause. For
instance, what happens if Michigan enforces a ban against the disposal of
waste that includes plastic bottles? Michigan has a refundable deposit on
plastic bottle beverages whereas Ontario simply has voluntary separation of
such garbage by providing separate receptacles for consumer disposal (and as
a result Toronto waste contains a greater amount of plastic bottles).
A possible alternative solution that would focus on reducing total waste
creation rather than just looking at waste trade, that would take account of
the potential intergenerational nature of the problem, that would also take
account of the high degree of integration between the United States and
Canadian economies, and that would minimize the uncertainty of go-it-alone
approaches by individual states is for the Canadian and U.S. federal
governments to negotiate (in consultation with provincial and state officials)
some minimum standards in terms of waste reduction. A "one size fits all"
standard for all states and provinces would be inappropriate. Instead some
criteria for individualized action plans might be crafted that allows for
needed (and efficient) flexibility. For instance, 41 percent of the waste in
Toronto landfills is organic,53 so composting might be a realistic solution for
Toronto, whereas, recycling might work best for another municipality. Such
negotiations may gain increased support as the "importer-exporter state"
distinction continues to break down as more and more states become both
heavy exporters and importers of waste. Negotiations between the Canadian
and U.S. governments could also eliminate or minimize any trade agreement
problems (and thought should be given whether to include Mexico in such
discussions as well).
One critical decision in any such negotiations is what to use as an
enforcement device, namely whether a state would be authorized to impose
discriminatory fees against waste from another state or province that did not
create a satisfactory waste reduction plan according to the negotiated criteria.
However, a decision on this can be deferred because any dramatic and quick
change from the open border, non-discrimination model will cause the
problems described above. Moreover, positive incentives can be utilized as
an alternative. Specifically, the federal government could provide additional
53 CITY OF TORONTO, ONTARIO, WASTE DIVERSION TASK FORCE 2010 REPORT 4 (2001),
available at http://www.city.toronto.on.ca/taskforce201 0/report.pdf.
2002]
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monies for states that meet certain guidelines in establishing programs on
waste reduction, recycling, or composting.
Thank you.
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